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Abstract. Inference control for protecting the privacy of microdata (individual data) should try to optimize
the tradeoff between data utility (low information loss) and protection against disclosure (low disclosure risk).
Whereas risk measures are bounded between 0 and 1, information loss measures proposed in the literature for
continuous data are unbounded, which makes it awkward to trade off information loss for disclosure risk. We
propose in this paper to use probabilities to deﬁne bounded information loss measures for continuous microdata.
Keywords: database security, privacy, statistical disclosure control, microdata protection, information loss
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1. Introduction
The purpose of privacy protection in statistical databases, also known as Statistical Disclo-
sure Control (SDC) or Statistical Disclosure Limitation (SDL), is to allow publication of
statistical data in such a way that they do not give away conﬁdential information that can
be linked to speciﬁc individuals or entities. This is a relevant issue in domains as diverse
as ofﬁcial statistics, e-health and e-commerce.
The challenge for SDC is to modify data in such a way that the risk of disclosing
information on speciﬁc respondents becomes low enough while keeping at a minimum
the information loss, i.e. the loss of the accuracy sought by database users. Thus, it is of
paramount importance for a data protector using SDC to be able to compare and trade off
information loss and disclosure risk to reach a suitable balance.
SDC can be applied to information in several formats and ﬂavors: tabular data, dynamic
databases and also microdata (individual respondent records). This paper is related to
microdata protection and, more speciﬁcally, to measuring the information loss caused
by SDC methods, also known as masking methods, when applied to the protection of
continuous (numerical) microdata.182 MATEO-SANZ, DOMINGO-FERRER AND SEB´ E
1.1. Contribution and plan of this paper
Section 2 presents previous information loss measures deﬁned in the literature for contin-
uous data. Section 3 discusses the problems of combining these existing information loss
measures with disclosure risk measures. Section 4 describes a new approach to measuring
information loss for continuous data which, being based on probabilities, provides mea-
sures bounded between 0 and 1 that can readily be combined with risk measures. Section 5
presents empirical results showing the high correlation of the new measures with previous
measures in the literature; it also presents an example application of the proposed measures
to evaluate the information loss caused by several masking methods to a speciﬁc microdata
set. Section 6 is a conclusion.
2. Background on information loss measures for continuous data
Astrictevaluation ofinformation lossmust bebased on thedata usestobe supported by the
protecteddata.Thegreaterthedifferencesbetweentheresultsobtainedonoriginalandpro-
tecteddataforthoseuses,thehigherthelossofinformation.However,veryoftenmicrodata
protection cannot be performed in a data use speciﬁc manner, for the following reasons:
• Potential data uses are very diverse and it may even be hard to identify them all at the
moment of data release by the data protector.
• Evenifalldatausescanbeidentiﬁed,issuingseveralversionsofthesameoriginaldataset
so that the i-th version has an information loss optimized for the i-th data use may result
in unexpected disclosure.
Since data must often be protected with no speciﬁc data use in mind, generic information
loss measures are desirable to guide the data protector in assessing how much harm is being
inﬂicted to the data by a particular masking method.
Deﬁning what a generic information loss measure is can be a tricky issue. Roughly
speaking, it should capture the amount of information loss for a reasonable range of data
uses. We will say there is little information loss if the protected dataset is analytically valid
and interesting according to the following deﬁnitions by Winkler (1999):
• Aprotectedmicrodatasetisanalyticallyvalidifitapproximatelypreservesthefollowing
with respect to the original data (some conditions apply only to continuous attributes):
1. Means and covariances on a small set of subdomains (subsets of records and/or
attributes)
2. Marginal values for a few tabulations of the data
3. At least one distributional characteristic
• A microdata set is analytically interesting if six attributes on important subdomains are
provided that can be validly analyzed.PROBABILISTIC INFORMATION LOSS MEASURES 183
More precise conditions of analytical validity and analytical interest cannot be stated
without taking speciﬁc data uses into account. As imprecise as they may be, the above
deﬁnitions suggest some possible measures:
• Compare raw records in the original and the protected dataset. The more similar the
masking method to the identity function, the lesser the impact (but the higher the dis-
closure risk!). This requires pairing records in the original dataset and records in the
protected dataset. For masking methods based on the original data, each record in the
protected dataset is naturally paired to the record in the original dataset it originates
from. For synthetic microdata preserving only some features of the original data, pairing
is more artiﬁcial. In Dandekar et al. (2002) we proposed to pair a synthetic record to the
nearest original record according to some distance.
• Compare some statistics computed on the original and the protected datasets. The above
deﬁnitions list some statistics which should be preserved as much as possible by a
masking method.
To be speciﬁc, assume a microdata set with n individuals (records) and p continuous
attributes. Let X be the matrix representing the original microdata set (rows are records and
columns are attributes). Let X  be the matrix representing the protected microdata set. The
following tools are useful to characterize the information contained in X and X :
• Covariance matrices V (on X) and V  (on X ).
• Correlation matrices R and R .
• Correlation matrices RF and RF  between the p attributes and the p factors PC1, ..., PCp
obtained through principal components analysis.
• Commonality between each of the p attributes and the ﬁrst principal component PC1
(or other principal components PCi’s). Commonality is the percent of each attribute that
is explained by PC1 (or PCi). Let C be the vector of commonalities for X and C  the
corresponding vector for X .
• Factor score coefﬁcient matrices F and F .M a t r i xF contains the factors that should
multiply each attribute in X to obtain its projection on each principal component. F  is
the corresponding matrix for X .
There does not seem to be a single quantitative measure completely capturing the in-
formational difference between X and X . Therefore, it was proposed in Domingo-Ferrer
et al. (2001) and Domingo-Ferrer and Torra (2001a) to measure information loss through
the discrepancies between matrices X, V, R, RF, C and F obtained on the original data and
the corresponding X , V , R , RF , C  and F  obtained on the protected dataset. In particular,
discrepancy between correlations is related to the information loss for data uses such as
regressions and cross tabulations.
In Domingo-Ferrer et al. (2001) and Domingo-Ferrer and Torra (2001a), matrix discrep-
ancy was measured in three ways:
Mean square error: Sum of squared componentwise differences between pairs of matrices,
divided by the number of cells in either matrix.184 MATEO-SANZ, DOMINGO-FERRER AND SEB´ E
Table 1. Information loss measures for continuous microdata.
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Mean absolute error: Sum of absolute componentwise differences between pairs of matri-
ces, divided by the number of cells in either matrix.
Mean variation: Sum of absolute percent variation of components in the matrix computed
on protected data with respect to components in the matrix computed on original data,
divided by the number of cells in either matrix. This approach has the advantage of not
being affected by scale changes of attributes.
Table 1 summarizes the measures proposed in Domingo-Ferrer et al. (2001) and
Domingo-Ferrer and Torra (2001a). In this table, p is the number of attributes, n the
number of records, and components of matrices are represented by the corresponding low-
ercase letters (e.g. xij is a component of matrix X). Regarding X − X  measures, it makes
also sense to compute those on the averages of attributes rather than on all data (call this
variant ¯ X − ¯ X . Similarly, for V − V   measures, it would also be sensible to use them to
compare only the variances of the attributes, i.e. to compare the diagonals of the covariance
matrices rather than the whole matrices (call this variant S − S ).
In Yancey et al. (2002), it was observed that dividing by xij causes the X − X  mean
variation to rise sharply when the original value xij is close to 0. This dependency on the
particular original value being undesirable in an information loss measure, the authors of
Yancey et al. (2002) proposed to replace the mean variation of X − X  by the more stable
measure
1
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where Sj is the standard deviation of the j-th attribute in the original dataset.PROBABILISTIC INFORMATION LOSS MEASURES 185
3. Trading off information loss and disclosure risk
There is a broad choice of methods for continuous microdata protection (see Domingo-
Ferrer and Torra (2001a) for an introduction). To increase the embarras du choix,m o s t
of such methods are parametric (e.g., in microaggregation, one parameter is the minimal
number of records in a cluster), so the user must go through two choices rather than one:
a primary choice to select a method and a secondary choice to select parameters for the
method to be used.
The optimal method and parameterization will be the ones yielding an optimal tradeoff
between information loss and disclosure risk. Thus, we need to be able to combine mea-
sures of information loss and measures of disclosure risk. Two approaches to do this are
conceivable:
Explicit: A score (formula) is adopted which combines information loss and disclosure risk
measures. This is the approach adopted in Domingo-Ferrer and Torra (2001b). Using
a score permits to regard the selection of a masking method and its parameters as an
optimization problem. This was exploited in Seb´ ee ta l .( 2002): a masking method was
applied to the original data ﬁle and then a post-masking optimization procedure was
applied to decrease the score obtained.
Implicit: No speciﬁc score can do justice to all methods for all data uses and all disclosure
scenarios.Thus,anotherpossibilityisforthedataprotectortoseparatelycomputeseveral
information loss and disclosure risk measures and choose the most appropriate method
based on a combination of the most relevant measures for the speciﬁc data use/disclosure
scenario. This implicit approach is adopted in Yancey et al. (2002), for example.
Whether explicit or implicit, a combination of information loss and disclosure risk
measures is best performed if both types of measures can be bounded within the same
range. Unfortunately, whilst disclosure risk measures are bounded, current information
loss measures for continuous data are not:
• Disclosure risk measures can normally be regarded as probabilities or proportions
bounded between 0 and 1, e.g. the probability that a certain respondent is re-identiﬁed
or the proportion of correctly re-identiﬁed records after a record linkage attack;
• However, being mean square errors, mean absolute errors and mean variations, the infor-
mation loss measures discussed in Section 2 are unbounded. Moreover, mean variations
may become huge when measured on magnitudes close to 0.
InTrottini(2003),theabovemismatchwasdetectedandasolutionconsistingofenforcing
upper bounds on information loss measures was proposed. In practice, the proposal in
Trottini (2003) was to limit those measures in Table 1 based on the mean variation to a
predeﬁned maximum value. Such an unnatural truncation clearly damages the accuracy of186 MATEO-SANZ, DOMINGO-FERRER AND SEB´ E
the resulting measures. We propose in the rest of this paper an approach which naturally
yields bounded information loss measures for continuous attributes.
Remark 3.1. Note that, for categorical attributes, information loss measures are naturally
bounded, because of the ﬁnite range of such attributes. Thus, the problem of unbounded
information loss measures appears only for continuous attributes.
4. Probabilistic information loss measures
In what follows, we view the original dataset X as a population with n records and the
protected dataset X  as a sample with n  records.
4.1. A generic measure
Given a population parameter θ on X, we can compute the corresponding sample statistic
ˆ   on X . Let us assume that ˆ θ is the value taken by ˆ   for a speciﬁc sample. The more
different is ˆ θ from θ, the more information is lost when publishing the sample X  instead of
thepopulation X.Weshownext how toexpress that lossofinformationthrough probability.
If the sample size n  is large, the distribution of ˆ   tends to normality with mean θ and
variance Var( ˆ  ). According to Kendall et al. (1994), values of n  greater than 100 are
often large enough for normality of all sample statistics to be acceptable. Fortunately, most
protected datasets released in ofﬁcial statistics consist of n  > 100 records, so that assuming
normality is safe. Thus, the standardized sample discrepancy
Z =
ˆ   − θ

Var( ˆ  )
can be assumed to follow a N(0,1) distribution.
Therefore, a probabilistic information loss measure pil(θ) referred to parameter θ is the
probability that the absolute value of the discrepancy Z is less than or equal to the actual
discrepancy we have got in our speciﬁc sample X , that is
pil( ˆ  ) = 2 · P(0 ≤ Z ≤
|ˆ θ − θ|

Var( ˆ  )
)( 1 )
4.2. Notation for population parameters and sample statistics
In this section, we identify and denote several population parameters θ and corresponding
sample statistics ˆ   which can be relevant to measure information loss. We start with
population parameters (on X) and then continue with sample statistics (on X ).
Let the r-th moment about zero of the j-th attribute of X be denoted by:
µ0
r(j) =
n
i=1 xr
ij
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The r-th central moment of the j-th attribute of X is expressed as:
µr(j) =
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The (r, s)-th central moment of the j-th and j -th attributes of X can be computed as:
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If r = s = 1, we get the covariance µ11(j, j ) between attributes j and j . In this way, the
correlation coefﬁcient can be expressed as
ρ(j, j ) =
µ11(j, j )
(µ02(j, j )µ20(j, j ))1/2
We now turn to the moments on a protected dataset X  with n  records corresponding to
the original dataset X. The moments on X  are regarded as statistics. We denote the r-th
moment about zero of the j-th attribute of X  by:
m0
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The correlation coefﬁcient between two attributes in X  can be expressed as
r(j, j ) =
m11(j, j )
(m02(j, j )m20(j, j ))1/2
4.3. Selected speciﬁc measures
Expression(1)canbeusedtoderiveaninformationlossmeasureforanyparticularstatistic.
For the sake of concreteness and comparability, we will consider here the same statistics
as Domingo-Ferrer and Torra (2001b) and Domingo-Ferrer et al. (2001), with the slight188 MATEO-SANZ, DOMINGO-FERRER AND SEB´ E
adaptation that direct comparison of data is replaced with quantile comparison. Given two
attributes j and j , this yields the following measures:
• pil(m0
1(j)) for the mean;
• pil(m2(j)) for the variance;
• pil(m11(j, j )) for the covariance;
• pil(r(j, j )) for Pearson’s correlation;
• pil(Qq(j)) for quantiles.
Being probabilities, all the above measures are naturally bounded within the [0,1] interval.
In order to get dataset-wide measures, we must average over the various attributes (as in
Table 1). This yields:
PIL

m0
1

=
p
j=1 pil

m0
1(j)

p
(2)
PIL(m2) =
p
j=1 pil(m2(j))
p
(3)
PIL(m11) =

1≤j<j ≤p pil(m11(j, j ))
p(p − 1)/2
(4)
PIL(r) =

1≤j<j ≤p pil(r(j, j ))
p(p − 1)/2
(5)
Remark 4.1. The normality assumption for the r(j, j ) statistic between two attributes j
and j  only holds when the population correlation ρ(j, j ) is sufﬁciently centered within the
interval[−1,1].Forvaluesofρ(j,j )closeto−1or1,computingpil(r(j,j ))usingExpression
(1) with a standard normal Z yields an overpessimistic information loss measure (Var(r(j,
j )) is very small). Still, when one takes the average PIL(r) over all pairs of attributes, the
result is usually coherent with the average PIL(m11) for covariances, as one would expect.
Remark 4.2. Using the fact that the correlation coefﬁcient is bounded in [−1, 1], one
might think of using as a non-parametric (and non-probabilistic) alternative to PIL(r)t h e
following one:

1≤j<j ≤p |r(j, j ) − ρ(j, j )|
p(p − 1)
(6)
Expression (6) is half the mean absolute error given in Table 1, which is bounded between
0 and 1. However, being non-probabilistic, this measure takes values often incoherent with
the average information loss for covariances PIL(m11). For example, one can easily get an
PIL(m11) in [0.75, 1] and an “optimistic” Expression (6) in [0,0.25]. This lack of coherence
is clearly undesirable for statistics as related as the covariance and Pearson’s correlation.
Remark 4.3. The loss measure PIL(Qq) for quantiles bears some resemblance to the
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value of the L1-norm between the densities of the original and protected attribute: both
measures are bounded in the [0, 1] interval, but they are not equivalent because the measure
in Agrawal and Aggarwal (2001) is not a probability.
4.4. Variances of the selected statistics
In order to use Expression (1) to construct pil(m0
1(j)), pil(m2(j)), pil(m11(j, j )), pil(r(j, j ))
and p(Qq(j)) we need the variance of each statistic or at least an approximation to it. This
is a technical but unavoidable issue.
Since we take the original dataset X as the population and the masked dataset X  as
the sample, our sampling method is the particular masking method used to obtain X 
fromX. Therefore, to be strict, the variance of each sample statisticdepends on the masking
method.However,derivingtheexpressionofthestatisticvarianceforeachmaskingmethod
whose information loss is to be measured is a cumbersome and hardly feasible task. Our
primary goal is to obtain information loss measures which can be easily applied to any
maskingmethod.Inthatspirit,wesuggesttosacriﬁceaccuracytoapplicabilityandcompute
variances as if the sampling method were simple random sampling. Of course, some
masking methods may substantially differ from simple random sampling: for example, if
masking consists of replacing original values by their overall mean, one has zero variance
for the sample mean and so on. However, the fact that the new measures using those
simpliﬁed variances are highly correlated with previous information loss measures in the
literature (see Section 5) shows that the above is a reasonable approximation.
We will drop attribute indexes j, j  in the remainder of this section to improve readability.
Following the Chapter 10 of Kendall et al. (1994), we have that, under simple random
sampling, the variance of the sample mean is
Var

m0
1

=
µ2
n 
The variance of the sample variance is
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Finally, if q ∈ [0, 1], the variance of the sample q-quantile Qq is
Var(Qq) =
q(1 − q)
n  f 2
Qq
where fQq is the value of the attribute’s density function for the abscissa Qq.I fw et a k e
the dataset X as our population, it is unlikely that we know the analytical expression of
the attribute density functions. A simple method to estimate fQq is to approximate it by
countingtheproportionofrecordsincludedinanintervalaroundQq forthespeciﬁcattribute
being considered and then dividing by the interval width. It remains to decide what interval
should be taken. A possible (and arbitrary) option is (Qq − ε, Qq + ε), where ε is the range
of the attribute divided by 1000.
Remark 4.4. Kernel methods (Rosenblatt, 1956; Parzen, 1962; Silverman, 1982)a r ea n
alternativefordensityestimationbasedonhistogramsmoothing.Theymayyieldbetterden-
sity estimates than the simple approach sketched above, but they usually require more com-
putation. See H¨ ardle (1991) for a comprehensive discussion on kernel density estimation.
5. Empirical results
The “Census” dataset used in Domingo-Ferrer and Torra (2001b) was taken. This dataset
was extracted from the U. S. Current Population Survey 1995 and consists of 1080 records
with 13 continuous attributes.
Forthatdatasetandforall109maskingmethodsconsideredinDomingo-FerrerandTorra
(2001b), the behavior of the new measures deﬁned here was compared to the behavior of
measures IL1 to IL5 deﬁned in Domingo-Ferrer and Torra (2001b) and Domingo-Ferrer
et al. (2001). Speciﬁcally:
• PIL(Q) was constructed as the average of PIL(Q5) through PIL(Q95) in 5% increments,
so that it represents the average impact on quantiles from 5% to 95% for all attributes;
PIL(Q) was compared to IL1 (mean variation of original and masked individual attribute
values, that is, of X − X  in Table 1);
• PIL(m0
1) was compared to IL2 (mean variation of attribute means);
• PIL(m2) was compared to IL3 (mean variation of attribute variances);
• PIL(m11) was compared to IL4 (mean variation of attribute covariances, that is, of V −V  
in Table 1);
• PIL(r) was compared to IL5 (mean absolute error of Pearson’s correlations, that is, of
R − R  in Table 1);
• The average
PIL = 100 ∗ (PIL(Q) + PIL

m0
1

+ PIL(m2) + PIL(m11) + PIL(r))/5
was compared to the IL reported in Domingo-Ferrer and Torra (2001b) and Domingo-
Ferrer and Torra (2001a)
IL = 100 ∗ (IL1 + IL2 + IL3 + IL4 + IL5)/5PROBABILISTIC INFORMATION LOSS MEASURES 191
Table 2. Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlations between probabilistic measures and measures in Domingo-
Ferrer and Torra (2001b) and Domingo-Ferrer et al. (2001).
Measure pair Pearson’s r Spearman’s r
(PIL(Q),IL1) 0.693 0.902
(PIL(m0
1), IL2) 0.918 1.000
(PIL(m2),IL3) 0.531 0.977
(PIL(m11),IL4) 0.592 0.950
(PIL(r),IL5) 0.781 0.995
(PIL, IL) 0.824 0.955
ComparisonwasperformedbycomputingPearson’sandSpearman’s(rank)correlationsfor
eachoftheabovesixpairsofmeasurestakenoverthe109maskingmethods.Theresultsare
given in Table 2. It can be seen that both types of measures are highly correlated, regardless
of whether Pearson’s or Spearman’s coefﬁcient is used: the pair of average measures (PIL,
IL) has coefﬁcients 0.824 and 0.955. The fact that Spearman’s rank correlation is so high
is very interesting, because it means that both types of measures rank the 109 masking
methods in much the same way.
We next give the values for the new measures for some masking methods and param-
eterizations which had been found in Domingo-Ferrer and Torra (2001b) to yield a good
score, i.e. a good tradeoff between information loss and disclosure risk. These were:
• Rankswap7. Rank swapping (Moore, 1996) with parameter p = 7. Rank swapping
consists of: ﬁrst, ranking the values of an attribute in ascending order; second, swapping
each value of the attribute with another value randomly chosen so that the rank of the
two swapped values does not differ by more than p% of the total number of records.
• Mic3mul7. Microaggregation (Domingo-Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz, 2002) taking three at-
tributes at a time and group size k = 7. Microaggregation consists of clustering records
of at least k records; rather than publishing attribute values for each individual, the aver-
age of the attribute values over the group to which the individual belongs is published.
Groups can be formed independently for each attribute, considering two attributes at a
time, three attributes at a time, all attributes at once, etc.
• Micmul3. Microaggregation taking all attributes at once and group size k = 3.
• Noise16. Additive noise with parameter p = 0.16. Gaussian noise is added to the original
data to get the masked data. If the standard deviation of the original attribute is s, noise
is generated using a N(0, ps) distribution.
Table 3 gives the probabilistic information loss measures corresponding to versions of
the “Census” dataset masked using the above four masking methods. For microaggregated
data, a simple rescaling transformation can bring the impact PIL(m2) on variances down
to 0 without signiﬁcant increase for the other measures. The same transformation brings
PIL(m0
1) and PIL(m2) to 0 for noise-added data. The rescaling transformation for the j-th192 MATEO-SANZ, DOMINGO-FERRER AND SEB´ E
Table 3. Probabilistic information loss measures on the “Census” dataset.
Method PIL(Q) PIL(m0
1) PIL(m2) PIL(m11) PIL(r)
Rankswap7 0000 .4540 0.5933
Mic3mul7 0.3640 0 0.4403 0.3022 0.3309
Micmul3 0.4987 0 0.7004 0.1846 0.5341
Noise16 0.4524 0.1608 0.4447 0.1342 0.4929
Scal Mic3mul7 0.3760 0 0 0.2138 0.3309
Scal Micmul3 0.4979 0 0 0.3631 0.5341
Scal Noise16 0.4467 0 0 0.3271 0.4929
masked attribute is

(xij − m0
1(j))
√
µ2(j)
√
m2(j)

+ µ0
1(j)
In Table 3, Scal Mic3mul7, Scal Micmul3 and Scal Noise16 are microaggregation and
noise addition methods with rescaling. It can be seen that:
• Scal Mic3mul 7 is the method among those considered in Table 3 that performs best for
the overall set of probabilistic measures considered;
• However, Rankswap7 might be preferable if quantile preservation is critical;
• Additive noise considered here is uncorrelated, that is, it is applied independently to each
attribute. Correlated noise addition, with a covariance matrix   equal to the covariance
matrix of original data, would probably yield lower PIL(m11) and PIL(r). However, our
objectiveistopresentnewinformationlossmetricsratherthanthebestmaskingmethods;
thus, we have used uncorrelated noise for comparability with Domingo-Ferrer and Torra
(2001b) and Domingo-Ferrer et al. (2001) where that was the kind of noise considered.
6. Conclusions
Statistical Disclosure Control is about optimizing the tradeoff between disclosure risk
and the information loss inﬂicted to data. We have shown a way to obtain probabilistic
information loss measures for assessing the impact of masking methods on continuous
microdata sets. Previous information loss measures were unbounded and compared only
awkwardlywithdisclosurerisk,whichisboundedbetween0and1.Beingprobabilistic,the
measures presented in this paper are also bounded between 0 and 1, so they make it easier
for data protectors to ﬁnd an optimal balance between information loss and disclosure risk.
Remark 6.1. A web form and the C source code for computing the probabilistic infor-
mation measures proposed in this paper on any pair of original and masked datasets are
available at http://vneumann.etse.urv.es/SDC/measures.PROBABILISTIC INFORMATION LOSS MEASURES 193
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